The formal security policy model and security analysis is necessary to help Database Management System (DBMS) to attain a higher assurance level. In this paper we develop a formal security model for a DBMS enforcing multiple security policies including mandatory multilevel security policy, discretionary access control policy and role based access control policy. A novel composition scheme of policies is introduced. And the security properties are comprehensively and accurately specified in terms of about 17 state invariants and state transition constraints. Furthermore, the security of the model is proved with the Z/EVES theorem prover.
INTRODUCTION
Formal modeling plays a key role in building trusted software systems, such as trusted OS, DBMS or other applications. Various security evaluation standards and criteria, including Common Criteria [1] , TCSEC [2] of US, GB17859 [3] of China, require that formal model and security analysis be presented to be evaluated at higher assurance level.
The SeaView [4] model is one of the earliest influential security models for multilevel secure database based on Bell LaPadula model (BLP) [5] . It is verified in [6] . Recently [7] extended the object structure of the SeaView Model and, modeled the security policy in formal language and proved the security with the help of Coq proof assistant. But role based access control (RBAC) [8] is not supported in these models. A powerful and flexible authorization mechanism was proposed in [9] to enforce any different security polices in DBMS. However, due to efficiency consideration, this mechanism is never adopted in practical DBMS. A design framework of database system supporting BLP, DAC (Discretionary Access Control) and RBAC policies was proposed in [10] while the formal security model is not presented. Because many commercial DBMSs are supporting these policies, there is an emerging demand for a formal and accurate security model of DBMS supporting all the previous security policies.
In this paper, a formal security policy model (named as SEPOSTG, for Secure PostgreSQL) of DBMS supporting multiple security policies is proposed, based on which we enhanced the open source DBMS PostgreSQL [11] to enforce multiple security policies and aimed to boost its security level to TCSEC B2.
Our main contributions in this paper are threefold: 1) Multiple security policies including BLP, DAC, and RBAC are modeled. Especially, a novel composition scheme of multiple policies is proposed. 2) We present 15 state invariants and 2 state transitions in this paper, most of them are either new or improved compared to those in the literature, to model the security properties after analyzing the security policies thoroughly and comprehensively. 3) The model is expressed in formal language Z [12] , and can be proved automatically with the help of the theorem prover Z/EVES. As the security model for fine-grained entities such as tuples, attributes, elements in a tuples is well defined in other works, we do not consider those entities in this paper so as to greatly facilitate the security proof of our model. Furthermore, our model can be easily integrated with the other security models consisting of fine-grained entities because of its modular design.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the policy composition scheme of multiple policies is discussed. In Sections 3, 4, 5, the basic definition of entities and principals, security requirement termed as invariants and constraints, and operation rules are presented sequentially. The security analysis of the model is described in Section 6.
II. POLICIES COMPOSITION
In the SEPOSTG model, three typical security policies, namely BLP, DAC, and RBAC, will be enforced. Among the policies, multilevel BLP is required by the standards for higher assurance level. From management point of view, the management privileges are assigned to a few managers in RBAC such that management privileges are centralized and strictly protected, while every owner has the management privileges with regarding to his own data in DAC such that the management privileges is distributed and flexible. Although RBAC can simulate DAC or BLP model, the efficience is damaged. Therefore, our model supports both of them. The problem is the choice of policies composition scheme so as to make the model consistent, expressive, and effective. As to an access request, the access control decision made by the SEPOST model depends on the composition of decisions by BLP, DAC and RBAC respectively. We introduce a decision function to model the access control decision made by the composed policies.
Suppose that, for a complete model, in one state of the system, for any access request to the model, the access control decision would be {YES, NO, UNDEFINED}. Then, we can build 3 8 =6561 decision functions for composed policies from BLP, DAC and RBAC. According to the analysis of each decision function, most of them are impractical. Apparently, BLP is a mandatory policy that every access request should respect. However, the composition of RBAC and DAC with 'OR' relation is not suitable, because it will result in unnecessarily replicated authorizations. Based on the evaluation standards and the above observation, one may choose the composition as the following function:
The connotation of this function is, all access requests must meet BLP policy, and meet either RBAC or DAC. Table 1 illustrates the composition when all policies involved are complete (without UNDEFINED decision). If the decision of any component policy is UNDEFINED with respect to an access request, then the decision of the composed policy is UNDEFINED. However, the above straightforward composition is not satisfactory in practice. As we know, RBAC is more suitable for organizational policy, while DAC is more suitable for personal policy. Consequently, with regarding to the decision function RD, one may use DAC policy to corrupt the RBAC policy. The attack is as follows. The standard RBAC can not explicitly express negative authorization (which means to deny one role the privilege of access to one object) so that it is assumed by default that if there is no authorization for an access request then the request is denied. However, one subject which is assumed by the organizational policy administrator to be denied access to one object in RBAC may be granted access privilege in DAC by another subject. In this way, the effect of the RBAC policy becomes unexpected. One approach to this problem is to add negative privilege explicitly to RBAC policy, but the constraints of the approach is that it will add significant burden to the system administrator because there are huge volumes of data in DBMS generally.
We take another approach to the problem. The objects are classified into two categories based on the owner of the object. The owners of objects are: system administrator, and others. RBAC policy are applicable to the objects owned by system administrator, DAC policy are applicable to objects owned by other owners. The owner of an object can be changed by the security administrator so that we can change the policy on an object by changing its owner. When a user is removed from the system, the owner of objects owned by this user is changed to be the system administrator. Furthermore, for all privilege with no specific objects (e.g. system privileges), it is subject to RBAC policy.
Hence, the decision function of policy composition in our model SEPOSTG is formalized as:
Remark: user_kind(), owner() and SYSADM will be defined in the following section.
III. BASIC ELEMENTS AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we define the basic elements of our model SEPOSTG, including data types, constraints and variables.
A. Data types
There are seven basic data types in this model. Security Labels: [CLASSES, LEVELS, CATES], CLASSES is for security label type which is composed by linear ordered levels LEVELS and patiral ordered categories CATES.
Roles: [ROLES] , for Role based access control.
Subjects: [USERS, SESSIONS, TRANS], SESSIONS models the process between user login and logout, TRANS is correspondent to transaction in DBMS.
User Kinds: UKIND := SYSADM|SECADM|AUDADM|COM. In order to limit the power of administrator, there are three kinds of administrators introduced to assume different duties. The duty of the system administrator is the routine of system management, such as user or data object creation/removal; the duty of the security administrator is the maintenane of security policy; the auditor is in charge of audit policy. It is required in this model that system administrator has no privileges to read/write access to the content of an object. The data objects in DBMS are related in a tree structure, and parent node is called as the container of child node. Database is at the root of the tree, and is the largest container. Element is at the leaf and is not container.
Objects: [DATABASES], [MREALTIONS, MREAL-IDS, MVIEW-IDS, MTUPLES, ELEMENTS], [AUXS
: The state variables for discretionary access control (DAC) are as follows. dac_uer_perms means that a user's permission set of (Privilege, object predicate, parameters list).
OBJECTS:=DATABASES MRELATIONS MTUPLES ELEMENTS AUXS SUBORDS :OBJECTS USERS :USERS (PRIVILEGES (ATTRS (VALUES)))
The variables for mandatory access control (MAC) include security labels set etc. Note that a security label c:CLASSES is composed of level and category which reflectes the class_level_cate mapping. In the security labels set class_exists there is a partial order dom (which is called as 'dominate' relation), and in level set level_exists there is a total order dom 1 , and in cate_exists there is a partial order dom 2 .
In models supporting multilevel access control (BLP), all subjects and objects should be properly marked with security labels. The security label of a session initialed by a trusted user can be dynamically updated. As changing session security label will lead to start a new service process, we require that the security label of a transaction cannot be changed during its lifetime.
The subject to security label mapping is: Lastly, we define two key variables of the model: current access permission state variable and current administration permission variable. The first variable models the non-administration (not the GRANT privileges) permissions of a transaction' access request, and is computed legally based on RBAC policy, DAC policy and BLP policy. Another variable, current administration permission variable, is concerned with the permissions related to GRANT privileges.
:
TRANS PRIVILEGES OBJECTS : TRANS PRIVILEGES OBJECTS
cur_perms cur_adm_perms
IV. INVARIANTS AND CONSTRAINTS
The key part of the DBMS security policy model is the definitions of security which are formalized as state invariants or/and state transition constraints. State transition constraints are enforced in every access request which will cause a state transition, while state invariants should be kept for every state which is reachable for any access requests from any initial state. Based on the evaluations standards (GB17859, TCSEC and CC), the characteristics of the component policies, and the DBMS application requirements, there are 14 state invariants and 2 state transition constraints identified in SEPOSTG, most of them are not reported before in the literature.
It is required that all reserved security labels (syshigh, syslow, trusted) are always members of class_exists; all security labels except trusted are dominated by syshigh and dominate syslow. There is an invariant to model the security labeling of subject including session, transaction and user. It is required that the security label of all sessions and transactions is not 'trusted'; and for untrusted users, the security label of session is dominated by user's security label who opens the session, and for all users, the security label of transaction is dominated by session's security label. Formally we have Subject Security Label Invariant:
: SESSIONS, : TRANS ( ) trusted Another invariant is to model the security labeling of objects in the hierarchy. It is required that the security label of all objects cannot be 'trusted', and the security label of an object dominates the security label of its parent in the hierarchy. For simplicity, we here only give the invariant for relation and database objects, invariants for other types of objects can be constructed similarly. There are three reserved administrators in the system. Each administrator is able to upgrade common user to be the same kind of administrator as itself, and/or grants the self privileges to the users. Therefore formally we have Initial Administrator Invariant: {sysadmin,secadmin, audadmin} The owner of an object has all the privileges including management privileges with respect to the object. Formally Ownership privileges Invariant:
: The static separation of duty SSD is defined differently from SSD in RBAC. In our model, the SSD:= ({r 1 , r 2 ,…r n },t) means that one user cannot have privileges (including inheritance) of t roles from {r 1 , r 2 ,…r n }. Formally Static Separation of Duty: 
V. OPERATION RULES
The operation rules are the mechanism of the model to enforce security policies. There are six types of operations: subject creation/deletion, data object create/deletion, security policy management, audit management and authorization, and public operations. Our model is modular such that newly added operations can be proved independently without affecting the security of previous operations. In this paper, we do not list all the operation rules due to space limitation. However the model is self contained and the correctness of the presented model is not affected.
There are object predicates in authorization of this model, so that it cannot directly decide whether an object is authorized. For notation, if there is a permission (p,f) in the authorization of user u in rbac_user_perms(u) and dac_user_perms(u) such that f(o)=true, then the user is authorized implicitly with (p,o). Similarly, a role activated in a session may be authorized implicitly with (p,o). No matter implicitly or explicitly, the subject is called as authorized. Next, some typical and important operation rules are presented. Others may be similarly constructed.
CREATE USER
on coarse grained entities such as database, This theorem can be automatically proved with the help of theorem prover. Actually, we have proved the above theorem in Z/EVES [12] with regard to most of the security properties. Some security properties are proved manually because of the limited expressiveness of Z/EVES.
